

regime for a particular intervention policy increases, the likelihood of the regime adopting that policy also increases. And as the collective (transnational) public opinion or domestic political elite support regarding a given policy declines (or opposition increases), the likelihood of the regime adopting a unified policy will also decline. The key here is that *collective, transnational* regime public opinion or domestic opposition support must increase or decrease. If significant differences in public opinion or domestic political opposition among member states exist, collective regime policy formation should logically be more difficult (if not impossible) to achieve.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### *Origins of the Crisis: The Breakup of Yugoslavia*

This is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the Americans. If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country, and it is not up to the Americans. It is not up to anyone else.

—Jacques Poos, foreign minister of Luxembourg and chair of the EC Council of Foreign Ministers

#### Introduction

The origins of the Western political and military interventions in the former Yugoslavia may be traced to the breakup of that country in 1991. The Yugoslav crisis erupted when Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia in June of that year, but the crisis itself began developing much earlier. The bold moves made by Slovenia and Croatia were very much in reaction to the policies of Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic. Milosevic had risen to power in Serbia as Communist Party chief but also on a political power base of Serb nationalism in the 1980s. By 1987, Milosevic had successfully used the power and organization of the Serbian Communist Party to consolidate his power and was officially elected president of Serbia in May 1989. One month later, Milosevic gave his (in)famous speech on Serb nationalism at the Field of Blackbirds—the site of the Battle of Kosovo in June 1389, when

Serbs were defeated by the Ottoman Empire.<sup>1</sup> The speech was essentially a call for a "Greater Serbia" based upon Serb national identity. By implication, this would necessarily entail either the dissolution of federal Yugoslavia or complete dominance of the country by Serbs. Either way, it was something that few non-Serbs in any of the republics could stomach.

Slovenia quickly became the primary opposition republic to Milosevic's policies.<sup>2</sup> Croatia soon followed Slovenia's lead, and political leaders in the two republics openly called for secession. Meanwhile, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), whose officer corps was dominated by Serbs, remained mostly loyal to Milosevic, and it was ordered to begin to seize the weapon stores of the Slovenian and Croatian Territorial Defense forces.<sup>3</sup> Behind the scenes, Milosevic informed the Slovenes that Serbia would not try to prevent their secession from Yugoslavia, since there were no substantial numbers of Serbs living in Slovenia; however, the same was not true for Croatia, and this became the initial source of the Yugoslav civil war.<sup>4</sup> Croatian nationalist Franjo Tudjman had been elected president of Croatia in 1990, and his policies frightened the Serb minority living in Croatia as much as (if not more than) Milosevic's policies many non-Serbs throughout Yugoslavia.

The final spark that ignited the powder keg of Yugoslavia occurred on June 25, 1991, when Slovenia and Croatia both declared independence. War briefly broke out between the Yugoslav Army and Slovenia two days later and quickly spread to Croatia. Since Slovenia was of little importance to Milosevic, the fighting there was brief and only lasted ten days before the Brioni peace agreement was agreed upon, and the JNA withdrew from the newly independent Slovenia. But things did not go as smoothly in Croatia, as Croats and Serbs battled for control of the predominantly Serb territory of Krajina. In an uneasy compromise to end the fighting, Slovenia and Croatia gained their independence but did not get back the aforementioned territories seized by the Serb-dominated Yugoslav federal army. The Bosnian Civil War that followed close behind Slovenian and Croatian independence (and is discussed in the next chapter) lasted more than two years and left an estimated one hundred and fifty thousand dead and over four million homeless (almost a quarter of the prewar population).<sup>5</sup>

As the Yugoslav crisis unfolded, all the members of the transatlantic security regime expressed various degrees of "moral outrage" over the violence in the former Yugoslavia, but they also initially shared a

profound reluctance to commit lives, money, and political capital in order to make any serious attempt at resolving the crisis. All of the regime members were also deeply confused and conflicted over key questions about the legitimate and effective use of military force. These common traits would continue to haunt the regime throughout the historical period covered by the case studies in this volume—and, as we have seen in the policy debates over Afghanistan and Iraq, to a high degree remain unresolved today.

This confusion and divisiveness was particularly obvious at the outset of the breakup of Yugoslavia. The only real policies the major members of the regime could agree on at the outset of the crisis were: (1) not to intervene militarily at all; (2) to use diplomacy to support Yugoslav territorial integrity; and (3) to keep NATO completely out of it.<sup>6</sup> Both Americans and Europeans were preoccupied with the impending disintegration of the Soviet Union and feared the precedent that the collapse of Yugoslavia might set. There was thus initially a general transatlantic agreement that federal unity should be preserved in both cases—until Germany started unilaterally pressing for diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in mid-1991.

The Bush administration was generally inclined to leave the problem to the Europeans, as it was heavily preoccupied with the Persian Gulf War and its aftermath, as well as a U.S. economy beginning to slide into recession. For their part, European leaders appeared confident and even eager to take on the Yugoslav crisis by themselves. In addition to the now infamous quote by Luxembourg Foreign Minister and Chair of the EC's Council of Foreign Ministers Jacques Poos about the "hour of Europe," European Commission President Jacques Delors went so far as to actually issue a warning(!) to the U.S. in the summer of 1991 that any active American engagement would be regarded as meddling in European affairs, saying: "We do not interfere in American affairs; we hope that they will have enough respect not to interfere in ours."<sup>7</sup>

However, EC/EU diplomatic intervention in its first foreign policy crisis was a complete failure. As Lawrence Freedman states, the priority given by the EC/EU to developing a *compromise* policy (one accommodating widely divergent national views and foreign policy interests) came at the expense of developing and implementing an *effective* policy.<sup>8</sup> And this did not conform to the intended new image crafted in the Maastricht Treaty of a new European Union able to assert itself not only in European matters but in global politics, as well, completely

shattering attempts to put a "Common Foreign and Security Policy" at the heart of the European integration project<sup>9</sup>—long before European political divisions over the Iraq War would appear in headlines. As the Yugoslav crisis quickly escalated beyond the Europeans' ability to deal with it, American involvement at some level became nearly unavoidable.

### Initial Responses and the Spread of War

To the extent that the West had a collective policy toward the Yugoslav crisis before the outbreak of fighting, that policy was generally aimed at discouraging the use of violence (by all sides) in order to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict.<sup>10</sup> By the spring of 1991, as Slovenia and Croatia were moving closer toward declaring independence, individual Western countries and international institutions alike publicly appealed for a peaceful settlement, hoping to maintain (at least in some form) Yugoslavia's unity. U.S. secretary of state James Baker met with the presidents of the six republics and Yugoslav prime minister Ante Markovic on June 21, urging them to keep Yugoslavia together.<sup>11</sup> Similarly, the European Community sent Commission president Jacques Delors to Belgrade to press for peace and Yugoslav territorial integrity. Speaking on behalf of the EC Council of Ministers, Luxembourg's foreign minister Jacques Poos (whose country held the six-month rotating European Council<sup>12</sup> presidency at the time) stated that the EC would not recognize a unilateral declaration of independence by Slovenia or Croatia; however, Dutch foreign minister Hans van den Broek (whose country would succeed Luxembourg to the Council presidency in July 1991) also warned that the EC would not support the Yugoslav federation "at any price."<sup>13</sup> Meanwhile, upon returning from Belgrade, the secretary of state issued a statement emphasizing the U.S. goal of "preserving the unity of Yugoslavia and opposing any changes in internal borders."<sup>14</sup> Yet, at the same time, it was becoming increasingly well known that EC members Denmark and Germany had been quietly but actively encouraging Slovene and Croatian independence—in complete contradiction to official EC policy.<sup>15</sup>

European leaders reacted to the outbreak of violence by initially pursuing diplomatic efforts almost solely through the EC. Four days after Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, the European Council

agreed on June 29, 1991, to send the "troika" (Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands)<sup>16</sup> on a diplomatic mission to Yugoslavia to try to mediate the conflict. However, it was Germany and Italy that took the lead in pushing for the EC's diplomatic intervention. On the night before the EC summit, Germany proposed that the EC hold "urgent consultations" on the Yugoslav crisis, and Germany and Italy together asked the Council to authorize a high-level EC mission to Yugoslavia; Germany also raised the issue of suspending EC aid to Yugoslavia.<sup>17</sup> In response, the Council decided to freeze economic aid to Yugoslavia if there was not an immediate cessation of violence.<sup>18</sup> As the troika departed for Belgrade, the EC called on Slovenia to suspend its declaration of independence, asked Serb leaders to support installing Stipe Mesic as head of the collective presidency,<sup>19</sup> and proposed a cease-fire with all forces returning to their barracks.<sup>20</sup>

The overnight mission to Belgrade and Zagreb seemed to produce the EC's first diplomatic success: an agreement to suspend hostilities and a three-month moratorium on Slovenia's and Croatia's move toward independence. It was hailed by many senior European officials as a sign of the EC's political leadership, diplomatic expertise, and strategic independence from the United States.<sup>21</sup> However, the fragility of the agreement was apparent from the beginning. As the violence continued unabated, Poos, on behalf of the EC, threatened to freeze all EC economic aid unless the agreement was implemented immediately. In an effort to salvage its diplomatic effort, the troika returned to Yugoslavia on June 30. The next day, Mesic was confirmed as the head of the federal government. In response to the troika's diplomatic effort, Slovenia called on the EC to send observers to monitor the terms of the agreement, and this was immediately supported by Germany.<sup>22</sup>

Meanwhile, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE—later renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) had begun to discuss the Yugoslav situation. Its member states (including Yugoslavia) agreed to an immediate cease-fire and return of troops to barracks but reached no agreement on an Austrian proposal that the CSCE send observers.<sup>23</sup> Two days later, representatives of the CSCE countries met in Prague (the seat of the CSCE secretariat). At the Prague meeting, CSCE officials reached an agreement on two diplomatic missions. The first sought to promote a dialogue among the parties "in consultation and agreement with the Yugoslav authorities"; and the second was an approval for the idea of sending

observers to monitor the cease-fire, with the logistical arrangements and details to be carried out by the EC.<sup>24</sup>

A group of senior EC officials was then sent to lay the groundwork for EC-led civilian mission to observe the cease-fire.<sup>25</sup> This was the first time the EC had ever attempted anything like this. The EC also agreed to send the troika to Yugoslavia on a third diplomatic mission, place an embargo against arms shipments to Yugoslavia, and suspend EC economic aid.<sup>26</sup> Prior to the July 5, 1991, EC foreign ministers' meeting, Dutch foreign minister Van den Broek and EC External Relations Commissioner Frans Andriessen met with Secretary of State Baker in Washington, where Baker gave his support to the EC's efforts and indicated that the United States would join in suspending aid and imposing an arms embargo.<sup>27</sup> The EC ministers also warned of the possibility of officially recognizing Slovenia and Croatia if violence from the Serb-dominated federal army continued.

On July 7-8, the troika met with representatives of the Yugoslav government, Serbia, Slovenia, and Croatia on the Adriatic island of Brioni and hammered out a "Common Declaration on the Peaceful Resolution of the Yugoslav Crisis." The Brioni Declaration ("accepted" but never actually signed by the various parties) contained four points: (1) the Yugoslav parties alone should decide their future; (2) negotiations on Yugoslavia's future should begin no later than August 1; (3) the Yugoslav presidency would assert authority over the federal army; and (4) all parties would refrain from unilateral acts, especially the use of violence.<sup>28</sup>

The EC's efforts to implement the Brioni accord initially focused on bringing an end to the fighting in Slovenia and a withdrawal of all federal Yugoslav troops from that republic—not a terribly difficult task, since Milosevic had essentially already decided to allow Slovenia to break away without much of a fight. On July 10, the EC foreign ministers met again and endorsed a decision to send thirty-fifty observers to Yugoslavia in order to monitor the proposed cease-fire; the ministers also rejected Germany's suggestion to include observers from other CSCE countries.<sup>29</sup> Initially, the observers were sent only to Slovenia. But with the Yugoslav government's decision to withdraw all federal forces from Slovenia (a de facto acceptance of Slovenia's independence), attention then shifted to Croatia. There was confusion over what role (if any) the observers should play in Croatia, and federal Yugoslav authorities resisted any effort to extend their mandate.

As fighting in Croatia escalated, the EC foreign ministers met again on July 29 in Brussels, joined (at the EC's invitation) by representatives from the Yugoslav federal presidency, prime minister, and foreign minister. France (supported by Italy and Belgium) suggested a European peacekeeping force for Yugoslavia, perhaps under Western European Union (WEU) auspices, but this was rejected by Dutch foreign minister Van den Broek and British foreign secretary Douglas Hurd; the ministers instead decided to extend the observer mission into Croatia and to increase its number to three hundred observers and three hundred support personnel (and to permit participation by other CSCE countries).<sup>30</sup>

This expansion of the EC observer mission was met with resistance from Serbia, however, and Serb forces in Croatia refused to allow EC observers to enter the contested areas. Then, on August 4, the troika abruptly left Yugoslavia, announcing, "There is nothing more we can do here."<sup>31</sup> The EC foreign ministers met again two days later and debated further economic sanctions (such as a full trade embargo) against any Yugoslav republic that opposed EC peace efforts and revisited the French peacekeeping proposal.<sup>32</sup> The WEU, however, announced that it was not willing to act unless the EC's diplomatic efforts had been completely exhausted, with the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, and Portugal voicing the strongest opposition to such a force.<sup>33</sup> The British view was best expressed by former British ambassador to West Germany Sir Oliver Wright: "It would be madness to send unwelcome troops into a dreadful quagmire."<sup>34</sup> Yet, ironically, this is exactly what the British and other Europeans would soon decide to do as members of a UN "peacekeeping" mission to Croatia and Bosnia.

On the same day (August 6), the Yugoslav federal presidency announced a cease-fire agreement by the warring parties. While the threat of EC economic sanctions may have influenced the decision, it is much more likely that heavy combat losses suffered by Croatian forces coupled with a threat of unilateral recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence by Germany and Austria were the main contributing factors. On August 8, the CSCE met again in Prague and decided (with Yugoslavia's agreement) to send two hundred-five hundred additional observers to help the EC monitor the cease-fire in Croatia.<sup>35</sup> However, Yugoslavia vetoed a British proposal to convene a full-blown peace conference.<sup>36</sup>

With any further CSCE involvement effectively blocked by a Yugoslav veto, the EC then attempted to organize its own peace conference, and this was formally endorsed by the EC foreign ministers on August 27. Despite the cease-fire agreement, fighting had broken out again in Croatia in mid-August, and one day before the foreign ministers' meeting, the Croatian Krajina village of Kijevo was completely leveled in a brutal Serb artillery bombardment.<sup>37</sup> This time, the EC specifically threatened to impose economic sanctions against Serbia if it rejected the peace conference. This action marked the first time that the EC had publicly and clearly singled out Serbia as the main cause of the continued violence in Yugoslavia. Germany (along with Italy) now began to openly threaten to unilaterally recognize Slovenia and Croatia if Serbia did not abide by the cease-fire agreement and agree to an international peace conference. The German government believed that threatening recognition would stop the war in Croatia; the terribly naïve notion was that if Slovenia's and Croatia's borders were recognized as international, Serbian aggression—which they (and many others) believed was the cause of war—would *have* to cease simply because it would then be illegal under international law.<sup>38</sup> The conference finally convened on September 7, even though the fighting continued unabated in Croatia.

As the fighting continued, Dutch foreign minister Van den Broek proposed that the EC develop a contingency plan to send a "lightly armed" contingent of up to thirty thousand peacekeepers to Yugoslavia under the aegis of the WEU in the event that a permanent cease-fire could be arranged.<sup>39</sup> The Dutch proposal was strongly supported by France (which had already been pressing for some sort of European peacekeeping force for some time), Germany, and Italy. The United Kingdom agreed to go along with the proposal but strongly opposed any armed intervention.

### Divergent Actor Preferences

Throughout the crisis so far, NATO had maintained a very low profile, only periodically making vague public statements that it was "greatly concerned" about the situation and "following the situation closely." Throughout July, NATO's Political Committee continued to meet to discuss the crisis, but no substantial policy recommendations

emerged. For its part, the United States remained determined to leave the initiative to the Europeans, and NATO never discussed playing any sort of military role or initiating any sort of contingency planning at that time.

In the first months of the conflict, the United Nations also maintained a relatively low profile. UN secretary general Javier Pérez de Cuéllar emphasized that the crisis was an "internal matter" that the Yugoslavs should resolve on their own.<sup>40</sup> He specifically rejected the idea of sending UN observers in response to the Slovene request on the grounds that Slovenia was not an independent and sovereign member of the UN (which was true), and that view was echoed by the U.S. ambassador to the UN Thomas Pickering who stated, "The UN has no role in Yugoslavia" unless the EC and CSCE efforts fail.<sup>41</sup>

For its part, the EC's diplomatic efforts to resolve the Yugoslav crisis were hindered by significantly divergent policy views among key member states. Initially, the EC's official position was to focus on trying to find a diplomatic solution that would maintain some form of federal Yugoslav state, and this led the EC to officially or publicly avoid supporting Slovenian and Croatian independence. However, as fighting intensified in the summer and autumn of 1991, Croatia was able to convince the German government to break from official EC policy. As Misha Glenny writes, Croatia gained this German support, in large part, by:

presenting itself as an integral part of a civilized Catholic, central European culture, while denigrating its Serbian neighbor as a representative of the barbaric, despotic Orient. Moreover, the drive for independence was presented as an act of liberation from decades of Serbian oppression. This killed two birds with one stone—both Catholic conservative circles in Germany and the Social Democrats and Greens. By the autumn of 1991, (German Foreign Minister) Hans-Dietrich Genscher had made the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia his personal crusade.<sup>42</sup>

A number of Bundestag members also began to openly call for a German foreign policy more strongly supportive of Slovenian and Croatian independence. This support for Slovenian and Croatian self-determination (in both the German government and in German public opinion) was reinforced by strong historical and cultural ties with the

Croatians (including the presence of five hundred thousand Croatians living in Germany).<sup>43</sup> Similar support was also expressed in Italy, especially among political leaders in the region near the border with Slovenia, as well as by the leader of the Italian Republican Party.<sup>44</sup>

By contrast, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Greece appeared most determined to hold Yugoslavia together. There were a number of reasons for this reluctance to support Croatian and Slovenian independence: fears that it would inflame separatist movements in their own countries, concern that dissolving Yugoslavia would set a dangerous precedent throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and (in the case of France and Greece) historical ties to Serbia.<sup>45</sup> Greece was the strongest supporter of maintaining the federal Yugoslav state, driven by its fear of a potential conflict with an independent Macedonia, as well as its strong political ties with and support of Serbia.<sup>46</sup> And, as Misha Glenny writes: "The position of the British and French governments was almost diametrically opposed to that of Germany. Recognition, they argued, would stir a hornet's nest. It was preferable instead to pursue a negotiated way out of the crisis..."<sup>47</sup> Although EC leaders were desperately trying to maintain an outward appearance of political unity, national diplomatic differences were becoming increasingly obvious.

Thus, as the summer of 1991 slowly passed, the governments of Germany and Italy, along with Belgium and Denmark, moved slowly but surely toward supporting recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. France, Spain, Greece, and the Netherlands remained the most strongly in favor of preserving Yugoslavia's unity (although criticism in the French press grew as the crisis dragged on), while the United Kingdom's position seemed to float back and forth somewhere in the middle.<sup>48</sup> In a famous statement that was clearly aimed at Germany—and one that was ultimately prophetic—Dutch foreign minister Van den Broek was quoted as saying, "It is easy from behind a desk to recognize Slovenia and Croatia and leave the rest of the work aside."<sup>49</sup>

### Enter the UN: Part One

With the EC's failure to find a viable means to stop the fighting, diplomatic efforts then began to turn to the United Nations. Austria formally called on the UN Security Council to take the lead in organizing

a "peacekeeping" effort—an idea that again had backing from France and Germany.<sup>50</sup> France (which also chaired the Security Council in September 1991) proposed that the UN establish an emergency peacekeeping force and impose an arms embargo against Yugoslavia. The Security Council refused to consider a peacekeeping force at that time, but in what would turn out to be a fateful decision, it voted to authorize a complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to all of Yugoslavia on September 25. Following this vote, UN secretary general Perez de Cuellar sent a special envoy, former U.S. secretary of state Cyrus Vance, to Yugoslavia on a "fact-finding" mission on October 8. After Vance's return, the secretary general presented a report to the Security Council, calling the fighting in Yugoslavia a threat to international peace and stability.

Meanwhile, the EC-sponsored peace conference was convened at The Hague, Netherlands, under the chairmanship of British diplomat Lord Peter Carrington. The EC proposed a new constitutional plan (the Carrington Plan) for Yugoslavia, with much more autonomy for the republics but still maintaining Yugoslavia's territorial integrity, and the United States and Soviet Union issued a joint communiqué in support of the EC's efforts.<sup>51</sup> All of the Yugoslav republics accepted the plan except for Serbia, which rejected it on numerous grounds. In response, the EC decided to impose economic sanctions against Yugoslavia and to ask the UN Security Council to impose an oil embargo; a NATO summit in Rome (held at the same time) also endorsed the EC's diplomatic efforts.<sup>52</sup> The United Kingdom introduced a draft resolution in the Security Council calling for an oil embargo against any of the Yugoslav republics that refused to halt the fighting. And Lord Carrington, Cyrus Vance, and Murrack Goulding (the UN official in charge of peacekeeping) traveled to Belgrade to make yet another attempt at negotiating a cease-fire.

At this point, the parallel activities of the EC and UN negotiators operated on a sort of "division of labor" agreed upon by Carrington and Vance, with the EC being responsible for negotiating a permanent political settlement and the UN for negotiating a cease-fire agreement sufficient to meet the conditions necessary for deploying a subsequent UN peacekeeping force.<sup>53</sup> In December, Vance did negotiate a new cease-fire agreement (officially signed on January 2, 1992)—the first with direct UN involvement—and offered a compromise plan on deploying UN peacekeepers.<sup>54</sup> Then, on November 27, the Security

Council adopted Resolution 721, urging the secretary general to present "an early recommendation" for a peacekeeping force if the conflicting parties observed the truce.

Yet, Vance's cease-fire agreement was predicated on an EC-negotiated overall political settlement—which German policy now made impossible. Even while the EC and UN negotiations were underway, German chancellor Helmut Kohl and foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher warned that Germany would unilaterally recognize Slovenian and Croatian independence by a deadline of December 25 if an agreement were not reached by an EC-imposed December 10 deadline, and Italy's prime minister stated that his country would act "in close solidarity and at the same time" as Germany.<sup>55</sup> Pérez de Cuéllar and Carrington, supported by the United States, strongly opposed the German proposal on the grounds that it would exacerbate the conflict.<sup>56</sup>

In any case, Germany remained insistent and built diplomatic support for its position. As Joyce P. Kaufman states:

On the eve of the signing of the Maastricht Treaty on December 9 and 10, 1991, at a time when the European Community was under great pressure to formulate a common foreign policy, Germany prevailed. Ultimately, Chancellor Helmut Kohl was able to obtain Britain, France, and Spain's agreement (it already had Italy and Austria's support) by making a number of concessions, one of which was that *all six former Yugoslav republics would be eligible for recognition.*<sup>57</sup>

Thus, on December 23, 1991, Germany recognized Croatia and Slovenia, followed on January 15, 1992, by EC recognition of the two countries. Chancellor Kohl called the decision "a great triumph for German foreign policy."<sup>58</sup>

For the entire year, official EC policy had been that Yugoslavia should remain intact as a sovereign state. Germany forced the issue by its unilateral foreign policy statements and actions, and other EC members reluctantly felt compelled to follow suit due to the negotiations underway on the Maastricht Treaty on European Union and its CFSP clause. While it had allowed the Europeans to take the lead role in attempting to solve the crisis, the U.S. administration of George H.W. Bush was opposed to EC recognition and prophetically warned that the fighting in Croatia would spread to multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina

as a result.<sup>59</sup> Indeed, the EC recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence may well have sealed the fate of Bosnia. As a regional international institution, the EC had wanted to play a special role in resolving the Yugoslav crisis and expected to play a special role in the recognition of Bosnia; yet it had no intention of playing a role in *protecting* Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina as independent states.<sup>60</sup> Thus, the Pandora's Box of self-determination had been opened once again in Europe, and out would come the Bosnian Civil War.

